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Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr. is a partner in the Boston law firm of Morgan, Brown &
Joy, a firm exclusively devoted to the practice of labor and employment law representing
management.

Throughout his career, Mr. DiGiovanni has specialized in representing institutions of
higher education on labor and employment matters and is counsel to numerous
institutions in the Northeast, including Harvard University, Brandeis University, Tufts
University, the University of Vermont, University System of New Hampshire,
Providence College and Rutgers, among many others.
His work has included the negotiations of numerous faculty and staff collective
bargaining agreements for various colleges and universities, and representation of
institutions in arbitration, agency hearings and court proceedings.
He is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Association of College and
University Attorneys and is a frequent speaker on labor relations and employment law
issues.
Mr. DiGiovanni holds a B.A. (summa cum laude) from Providence College (1970) and
received his J.D. from Cornell University Law School in 1973.
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The Sea Change at the NLRB
We live in odd times in the world of labor relations. On the one hand, the past
year has seen a Republican resurgence in Congress, the final collapse of the Employee
Free Choice Act- at least for now - and the stunning roll back of public sector labor rights
in several states around the country. In this climate, it is hard to think of too many bright
spots for labor. But clearly if there is one, it is centered in Washington at the National
Labor Relations Board.
Since President Obama’s 2010 appointments of three new members to the
National Labor Relations Board, the Board has shown a decided shift in its agenda
towards a more pro-union stance. Recent NLRB decisions, advisories, rulemaking and
other signals, as well as speeches by Board Members, all indicate that the Board is clearly
taking steps to change the legal landscape surrounding the National Labor Relations Act
in a manner which would be favorable towards unions.
The current Board’s makeup includes Board Chair Wilma Liebman (D) (term
ends August 2011); Mark Pearce (D) (term ends August 27, 2013) and Brian Hayes(R)
(term ends September 16, 2012). Member Craig Becker (D), serving on a recess
appointment until the end of 2011, has not yet been confirmed by the Senate for a full
term. In January of this year, the President nominated lawyer Terence Flynn to the Board,
but he has not yet been confirmed yet, and thus the Board stands today with a 3-1
Democratic majority. If not yet at full strength, the Board is large enough again to issue
consequential decisions that will alter previous pro-employer rulings.1
The new Board is going to leave its mark on the labor law landscape through
three primary methods: 1) case law, including revisiting and possibly reversing Bush
Board precedent; 2) General Counsel memoranda and guidance and 3) rule making.
First, the case law front: There is little doubt that the Obama Board, led by Board
Chair Wilma Liebman, will reconsider many cases decided during the Bush era, and
1

In a 5-4 ruling issued on June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court held that a two-member National Labor
Relations Board lacked authority to issue rulings. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, -- US --, 130 S.Ct.
2635 (2010) Writing for the Court majority, Justice Stevens interpreted the quorum requirements of
Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act as mandating three participating members “at all times” in
order for the Board to act. Thus, the Board could not delegate authority to decide cases with only two
Board members.
Between January 1, 2008 and March 27, 2010, Members Leibman and Schaumber became the only sitting
members of the Board. During this period, the two members decided almost 600 cases based on a
delegation of authority issued on December 27, 2007, when the Board consisted of four members. (Two
recess appointments expired on December 31, 2007.) However, they were careful not to issue rulings that
fundamentally changed prior case law to any significant degree. Such impediments are now gone.
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undoubtedly will reverse many of those rulings. Indeed, the Board has already taken steps
in this direction over the past year, with more to come.

Case Law: Reconsideration of Earlier Precedent
As noted last year, there are many areas where it was anticipated that the new
Board would seek cases to reverse prior Bush era rulings. Some examples of key
decisions that might be subject to reconsideration included:

1. Brown University 342 NLRB No. 42, 175 LRRM 1089 (2004) where the
Board, in a 3-2 decision, reversed its decision in New York University, 332 NLRB No.
111 (2000) and held that graduate students working as teaching assistants or research
assistants are not employees covered by the Act. The Board majority held that such
individuals “have a predominantly academic rather than economic relationship with their
school.”
2. Oakwood Healthcare Center, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006), the NLRB clarified
its stance on when an individual is deemed a “supervisor” and thus excluded from the
coverage of the Act and provided a liberal interpretation of who would qualify as a
supervisor. Labor contends that many individuals who have marginal authority have been
denied the right to organize under this decision.
3. IBM Corp., 341 NLRB No. 148 (June 9, 2004), where the Board reversed
Epilepsy Foundation. In IBM Corporation, the Board decided that the precedent of
Epilepsy Foundation should be overruled, and, by a 3-2 majority, the Board concluded
that the Weingarten rights do not extend to a workplace where employees are not
represented by a union.
4. The Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), where the Board held that
employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s email system, and thus, an
employer could regulate its use by prohibiting employee use of the system for non-job
related solicitation. In that case, even though employees used the email system for
personal communication, a rule banning its use for solicitation was still deemed
appropriate as long as it was not discriminatorily enforced.
The dissent argued that email was the virtual lunch room of the 21st century and that
any restrictions on employee use of the system for union solicitation, especially when
personal use was allowed should be presumptively discriminatory and illegal under the
long line of cases dealing with employee solicitation.
5. Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 NLRB 906 (2004), where the Board held
that when supervisory pro-union activity is objectionable conduct when it interferes in the
freedom of choice so as to materially affect the election outcome. It also held that
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supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards is inherently coercive absent
mitigating circumstances. The majority opinion said that the Board would look to
whether the supervisory conduct was generally interfering with employee free choice,
and, secondly, whether such conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent it
materially affected the election outcome.
The dissent contended that supervisory solicitation of union cards should not be
inherently coercive, even when the person is unaware that he or she is a true statutory
supervisor or where that status is unclear. Also, the dissent would look at such cases in
the total context of the employer’s anti-union campaign.
6. Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460 (2002) There are numerous Board
cases in which employer work rules are scrutinized to determine whether or not they
interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collective activity. At issue in
Tradesman was whether the following employer rules would “reasonably chill employees
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights”: (1) prohibition of disloyal, disruptive,
competitive or damaging conduct; (2) prohibition of slanderous or detrimental
statements; (3) requirement that employees represent the employer in a positive manner.
The Board held that these rules did not violate the Act because they serve a legitimate
business purpose and reasonable employees would not construe such rules as intended to
proscribe Section 7 activity. The dissent thought otherwise, arguing that such rules do
chill employees in organizing and coming together for collective action to improve the
workplace. The dissent would require an employer to specifically state that such rules do
not include Section 7 activity.
7. Dana Corporation and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,
and Agricultural Implement Workers, 351 NLRB No. 28 (9-29-07), where the Board
modified its recognition bar doctrine in cases where the union’s original majority status
was based on a card check rather than a Board-supervised election. In the case of Board
supervised secret ballot elections, no Board election can be held in the bargaining unit for
at least 12 months following the election. But in cases where an employer voluntarily
recognizes a union, the rules barring a decertification petition had been less clear. Under
prior law, an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union in good faith and based on a
demonstrated majority status immediately bars an election petition filed by an employee
or by a rival union “for a reasonable period of time.” Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157
NLRB 583 (1966). Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated during this insulated
period bars Board elections for up to three years of the contract’s term.
In Dana, the Board said it will strike a balance between the interest of employee
free choice and the promotion of stable labor relations. It established a policy that no
election bar will be imposed after a voluntary card check agreement unless 1) employees
in the unit are given notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days, to file a
decertification petition; 2) 45 days pass from the date of notice without the filing of a
petition. Thus, unlike Board supervised elections, in cases where there is a card check
recognition, disgruntled employees, or rival unions, who wish to file a decertification
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may immediately do so within a 45 day window period. Once that period passes,
however, the union’s majority status will be irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable
period of time to enable the parties to engage in negotiations for a first collective
bargaining agreement. Once any such agreement is reached, such a contract will further
bar elections for up to three years.

Already being reconsidered
The Board has already waded into the waters of reconsideration in several cases
and is likely to do more in the months ahead. Some examples:

1. Dana Corporation.
In Rite Aid Store, #647 and Lamons Gasket Co, No. 16-RD-15976 the Board
majority agreed to revisit Dana Corp. The Board sent out an invitation to file briefs to
interested parties and is now considering the case of Lamons Gasket Company in light of
such filings. At some point in the next year, the Board will undoubtedly issue a new
ruling on the subject of when a union voluntarily recognized by management may be
challenged through a decertification petition.

2. Brown University
Probably the least surprising event of the past year was the Board’s decision to
revisit Brown. Thus, on October 25, 2010 the NLRB in a 2-1 decision reversed a regional
director’s dismissal of a union’s petition which sought a vote on union representation for
graduate teaching and research assistants. New York University, 356 NLRB 7 (2010).
Through this recent decision, the NLRB stopped short of overruling its 2004 decision in
Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which held that graduate assistants were not
employees under the NLRA. However, the Board majority of Members Becker and
Pearce did state that there are “compelling reasons” to reconsider the Brown University
decision. The Board noted that those reasons included: 1) the contention by the
Petitioner that the Brown case was based on policy considerations extrinsic to labor law
and thus not properly considered in determining whether graduate students are
employees; 2) that the Petitioner offered to submit evidence of prior collective bargaining
experience in higher education and expert testimony demonstrating that, even giving
weight to the factors cited in Brown, the graduate students are appropriately classified as
employees; and 3) that the Brown decision was incompatible with Supreme Court rulings
on the definition of an employee under the Act.
Member Hayes dissented, noting that the Petitioner made no offer or claim that
there were any facts at all that would distinguish the individuals sought by its petition
with those found not to be statutory employees in Brown. The request, Hayes noted,
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“does nothing more than ask that a Board, with changed membership, view precisely the
same evidence and argument considered by a prior Board but reach an opposite result.
This is not a proper basis for reconsideration.”
This decision signals a potential change in the Board’s position on who are
considered to be “employees” covered by the NLRA.
While the full effect of this decision is not yet entirely clear, it does indicate that
the Board may be inclined to broaden the context of who is considered an “employee”
under the NLRA. With this decision, the NLRB laid the foundation for the potential
reversal of the Brown University decision by remanding the case to the region in order to
develop a full evidentiary record. Once the Board has this full record, it may then have
the necessary support to fully reverse the prior precedent and to thereby expand the
current scope of NLRA covered employees.
3. Hacienda Resort Hotel & Casino, 355 NLRB No. 154 (2010): Can Dues Check off be
Stopped after Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
In this case, the Board dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint that dealt with
the unilateral cessation of dues check off following the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement. While the right of the employer to unilaterally cease such check
off following contract expiration has been understood for decades,2 it had been revisited
in this case and the Ninth Circuit, in dealing with an earlier appeal, had instructed the
Board to articulate a rationale as to why the dues check off issue was in a separate
category from other terms and conditions of employment and thus could be exempt from
the unilateral change doctrine articulated in NLRB v. Katz 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Under
that doctrine, most contractual terms and conditions of employment must be maintained,
as a matter of law, after contract expiration as part of the status quo.
Upon remand, however, there were only four sitting members of the Board
(Member Becker had to recuse himself because of prior associations with the parties) and
the four of them deadlocked on the issue. Because of this even split, the Board had to
dismiss the complaint. However, the two opposing camps expressed their contrary views
on the subject.
Chairman Liebman and Pearce would have changed past policy on this issue.
They wrote:
We concur in the dismissal of the complaint. We write separately to express our
substantial doubts about the validity of Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 NLRB 1500,
1502 (1962), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1963), and its progeny, particularly
as applied in right-to-work states, where the collective-bargaining agreement
2

Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 NLRB 1500, 1502 (1962), remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1963),
7
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contains no union-security clause. As explained more fully in the dissenting
opinion in Hacienda I, the Board has never provided an adequate statutory or
policy justification for the holding in Bethlehem Steel excluding dues-check off
from the unilateral change doctrine articulated in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
743 (1962). Further, even assuming that Bethlehem Steel was correctly decided,
the Board has never provided a reasoned analysis for applying the holding in
Bethlehem Steel in a right-to-work context where dues check off could not
lawfully be linked with union security arrangements.
On the other hand, Members Hayes and Schaumber would uphold the case law that was
established fifty years earlier and allow an employer to cease dues check off after the
expiration of the contract. They wrote:
Unlike our colleagues, however, we respectfully maintain that application of the
Board rule regarding post-contract expiration of the dues check off obligation is
warranted for important legal, policy and equitable reasons….
There is a major distinction to be made between terms and conditions subject to
the Katz rule and the exceptions to that rule. The exceptions, including check off,
are uniquely of a contractual nature. In other words, provisions relating to wages,
pension and welfare benefits, hours, working conditions, and numerous other
mandatory bargaining subjects typically appear in a collective-bargaining
agreement, but those aspects of employment can exist from the commencement of
a bargaining relationship. The obligation to maintain them does not arise with or
depend on the existence of a contract. On the other hand, the obligation to check
off dues, refrain from strikes or lockouts, and submit grievances to arbitration
cannot exist in a bargaining relationship until the parties affirmatively contract to
be so bound.
In light of the deadlock and the fact that it is a tradition of the Board not to overrule
precedent without a three member majority, existing precedent had to be followed in this
case, leading to the dismissal of the complaint.
While this case did not change precedent, it is now clear that, with the right future
case, and with Member Becker’s future participation, this long standing precedent of
allowing cessation of dues check off may very well fall.

4. MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002). The successor bar rule. This 2002
decision had overruled St. Elizabeth Manor, 329 NLRB 341 (1999). However, this case is
now being reconsidered as a result of the Board granting of a request for review in UGLUNICCO Services, Co., 355 NLRB No. 155 (2010). The Board issued an invitation for
briefs last August.
In MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002), the Board reversed
the “successor bar” doctrine. Under the successor bar doctrine, once a successor
employer’s obligation to recognize an incumbent union attached, the union was entitled
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to a reasonable period of time for bargaining without challenge to its majority status. St.
Elizabeth Manor,Inc., 329 NLRB 341 (1999). In MV Transportation, the Board overruled
St. Elizabeth Manor and held that “an incumbent union in a successorship situation is
entitled to—and only to—a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status, which
will not serve to bar an otherwise valid decertification, rival union, or employer petition,
or other valid challenge to the union’s majority status.

Other Cases and Invitation for Briefs

1. Scope of bargaining units
On occasion, the Board will solicit briefs from the public on pending cases. This
approach is different from the “public comment” period that the Board must apply when
engaged in formal rulemaking, but no less important. A request for briefs can signal a
change in direction in Board case law where input from the public – in the form of legal
briefs – is desired before the Board changes courses. And in some recent situations, the
Board has called for briefs to help them interpret issues raised by particular cases.
One area where this occurred was in the health care field. In the 1980s, the Board
engaged in rulemaking in establishing presumptively appropriate bargaining units in
acute health care facilities. Now, the Board has turned to long term care facilities, such as
nursing homes. But rather than engage in rulemaking, it decided to invite briefs on a
pending case that involves the determination of appropriate units for collective
bargaining in long term care facilities. In Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center,
356 NLRB No. 56 (2010), the issue centered on whether a single unit limited to certified
nursing assistants at one facility was appropriate, or, as the employer contended, the only
appropriate unit was an larger unit of all nonprofessional employees at that facility. The
case is still pending and the Board invited briefs from the public, over the dissent of
Member Hayes, who expressed concern that Liebman, Becker and Pearce intended to use
the case to overrule precedent or establish broadly applicable rules concerning
determination of bargaining units. The briefing period closed on March 8 but was
recently extended.
While arising out of the health field, the call for briefs has raised larger questions
as to whether the Board is establishing a different standard for assessing community of
interest in all unit cases. Business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
have argued that NLRB should not depart from its traditional community of interest
approach in favor of a standard that would allow a union to seek certification among any
unit of employees performing the same work at the same facility without regard to
whether there are other employees sharing a community of interest with the workers
sought by a union. A case by case approach remains the preferred approach.
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And indeed that has been the approach for non-acute facilities ever since Park
Manor Care Center, 305 N.L.R.B. 872, (1991), where the Board held that in nonacute
health care facilities it preferred to take a pragmatic or empirical approach to unit
determinations that could include consideration of recurring factual patterns as well as
traditional “community of interest factors.” The Park Manor board said “after various
units have been litigated in a number of individual facilities, and after records have been
developed and a number of cases decided from these records, certain recurring factual
patterns will emerge and illustrate which units are typically appropriate.” In the instant
case, the Board now seeks input on such unit questions in nonacute care facilities.
But the Board also asked broader questions in calling for briefs that drew a dissent
from Member Hayes and vigorous comment from several organizations. The last two
questions the board invited amicus filers to address were:
(7) Where there is no history of collective bargaining, should the Board hold that
a unit of all employees performing the same job at a single facility is
presumptively appropriate in nonacute health care facilities? Should such a unit
be presumptively appropriate as a general matter?
(8) Should the Board find a proposed unit appropriate if, as found in American
Cyanamid Co., 131 NLRB 909, 910 [48 LRRM 1152] (1961), the employees in
the proposed unit are ‘readily identifiable as a group whose similarity of function
and skills create a community of interest'? ”
Hayes wrote that none of the parties in the Specialty Healthcare case sought the “broad
inquiry” announced by the board, and he warned that “the notice and invitation to file
briefs is a stunning initiative by my colleagues to consider replacing decades of Board
law applying the community-of-interest standard with a test that will likely find that any
group of employees who perform the same job in the same facility is an appropriate
bargaining unit, without regard for whether the interests of the group sought are
sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant the establishment of a
separate unit.” (See Daily Labor Report, BNA, March 11, 2011).
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce weighed in on the unit issues in the case but was
more concerned about the direction the Board was heading by posing the last two
questions. The Chamber also addressed the issues concerning the nonacute health care
industry, but began its argument by noting that the Board's invitation in questions 7 and 8
asked whether a bargaining unit should be considered presumptively appropriate in any
industry if the unit includes only employees who performed a single job at a single
facility. The Chamber expressed its concern that NLRB intends to consider its traditional
position that the interests of employees in a unit sought by a petitioning union must be
sufficiently distinct from those of other workers to justify the establishment of a separate
unit and pointed to a dissent by Member Becker in Wheeling Island Gaming Inc, 355
NLRB No. 127 (2010) that suggests such a direction. The Chamber, however, noted that
Section 9(c)(5) of the NLRA provides that “[i]n determining whether a unit is
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appropriate” for purposes of collective bargaining “the extent to which the employees
have organized shall not be controlling.”
The Board cannot, as suggested by Member Becker in Wheeling Island Gaming,
comply with Section 9(c)(5) merely by pointing to some community of interest factors
that are consistent with the extent of the union's organizing effort…..
The Board should continue to consider whether the scope of a proposed unit is
conductive to the bargaining that would follow certification and “should not, as
Member Becker suggests, simply approve the narrowest unit sought by the
petitioning labor organization and then leave it to the parties to reshape the unit”
if they find that a different unit would be more manageable or practical.
The Chamber also challenged the assertion that disputes over the scope of bargaining
units have been delaying resolution of representation cases in the health care industry.
Arguing that in health care and other industries the “overwhelming majority” of NLRB
elections are conducted pursuant to employer-union stipulations or agreements within
reasonable time frames, the chamber said “the data simply do not support the assertion
that unit scope issues are delaying elections in this industry.” (Daily Labor Report, BNA,
March 11, 2011

2. Duty to Provide Witness Statements to Union
Stephen Media and Hawaii Newspaper Guild, 356 NLRB No. 63 (2011).
In that case, the Board had found employer violated the Act by failing to provide
certain information to the union. But Board severed the question of whether the employer
had a duty to provide a particular statement provided to it by an employee or other
statements provided during the investigation of an employee’s alleged misconduct.
On March 2, 2011, the Board called for an “Invitation to File Briefs” on this issue.
The Notice and Invitation states:
Board precedent establishes that the duty too furnish information “does not
encompass the duty to furnish witness statements themselves.” Fleming Cos. 332
NLRB 1086, 1087 (2000), quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 237 NLRB 982, 985
(1978)…. This case illustrates, however, that Board precedent does not clearly
define the scope of the category of “witness statements.” This case also illustrates
that the Board’s existing jurisprudence may require the parties as well as judges
and the Board to perform two levels of analysis to determine whether there is a
duty to provide a statement: first asking if the statement is a witness statement
under Anheuser-Busch and then, if the statement is not so classified, asking if it is
nevertheless attorney work product. We have therefore decided to sever this
allegation from the case and to solicit briefs on the issues it raises.
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The questions raised were: What is a witness statement? And if a statement is not
a witness statement, is it nevertheless an attorney work product?
By way of background, Board precedent establishes that the duty to furnish
information to a union “does not encompass the duty to furnish witness statements
themselves” that may be obtained by an employer during an investigation. Fleming Cos.
332 NLRB 1086, 1087 (2000), quoting Anheuser-Busch, 237 NLRB 982, 985 (1978). In
Anheuser- Busch, supra, there were two conditions precluding disclosure. The first is that
the employee adopted the employer’s summary of his or her statement. Second, that
assurances of confidentiality had been given to the employee. The names of any
witnesses must be given in any event.
In Central Telephone of Texas, 343 NLRB 947 (2004), the Board noted that
witness statements prepared in anticipation of litigation were protected under the work
product privilege and did not have to be disclosed to a union. To qualify, the party
directing the statement must have a reasonable belief that litigation was a possibility.
In California Nurses Assn., 326 NLRB 1362 (1998), it was held that a union is not
entitled to pre-arbitration discovery. However, in Ormet Aluminum Products, 335 NLRB
788 (2001), the Board distinguished California Nurses in a case where the request for the
statement was made at the grievance stage, not the arbitration stage. Since the grievances
were not “pending arbitration,” it cannot be said the union was seeking pretrial discovery.
In the Stephen Media case, the administrative law judge noted that, under the facts
of that case, a witness statement had been made before there was even a decision on
discipline cannot be construed as such a work product. Under those circumstances, the
judge found that the statement of an employee made during the course of the
investigation had to be disclosed.

Actions of General Counsel:
The General Counsel’s Office can also be a source for subtle changes in the law
under the Act and in recent months, Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has been
aggressive in carving out some particular areas of concern and altering past Board
practice in these areas. His GC Memoranda of particular note thus far follow.

GC Memorandum 11-05.
Regarding the Board’s standards for deciding whether to defer to an arbitration award
as a resolution of an unfair labor practice charge.
When conduct alleged as an unfair labor practice is also the subject of a grievance
alleging that the conduct violated a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB has two
concerns: 1) to carry out its statutory mandate to prevent unfair labor practices by
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investigating and deciding the charge; 2) but on the other hand, to foster the statutory
policy in favor of private resolution of disputes through the collective bargaining process.
Under the Collyer doctrine, the Board implements both policies by suspending the
processing of the unfair labor practice charge and awaiting the outcome of the grievancearbitration process.
On occasion, grievants claim that although the arbitration resolved the contract claim, it
did not properly deal with the unfair labor practice issues. The Board’s Spielberg/Olin
line of cases articulated a test for deciding whether to defer to the arbitration award. The
Board will accept the arbitrable resolution of the statutory claim provided: 1) the
contractual and statutory claims were “factually parallel,” and 2) the facts relevant to the
statutory claim were “presented generally” to the arbitrator and 3) the arbitrator’s award
was not “clearly repugnant” to the Act or “palpably wrong.”
General Counsel Lafe Soloman believed that these standards should be revisited. He
indicated in his Memorandum that he will urge the Board to challenge the Spielberg/Olin
standard and defer “only if the arbitrator or parties to the grievance settlement had the
authority to, and did, consider the statutory claim. General Counsel would preserve the
“clearly repugnant” aspects of the standard, however. In particular, the Memorandum
stated:
In Section 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a)(3) statutory rights cases, the Board should no longer
defer to an arbitral resolution unless it is shown that the statutory rights have been
adequately considered by the arbitrator…. [the party seeking] deferral must
demonstrate that : 1) the contract had the statutory right incorporated in it or the
parties presented the statutory issue to the arbitrator; and 2) the arbitrator correctly
enunciated the applicable statutory principles and applied them in deciding the
issue. If the party urging deferral makes that showing the Board should defer
unless the award is clearly repugnant, i.e. the arbitrator’s award is not susceptible
to an interpretation consistent with the Act.” (GC Memorandum 11-05 at page 7)
Additionally, the Memorandum directed before the Regions defer to arbitration under
Collyer, they should take affidavits from the charging party and all witnesses within the
control of the charging party before they make their “arguable merit’ determination.

GC Memorandum 10-07 and 11-01
Re effective remedies for unfair labor practices during union organizing campaigns
Guidance by General Counsel that remedies for serious violations of the Act
during campaigns be dealt with quickly, including the use of Section 10(j) injunctive
relief. The type of cases to which this initiative is directed include: discharge or
retaliation against key union activists; threats of discharge; threats of closure or other
adverse consequences of employees support unionization, interrogation, and solicitation
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of grievances and promise or grant of benefits. GC 11-01 in particular is premised on the
principle that the impact of a nip-in-the-bud violation is not confined to the individual
victim of the violation but resounds among all employees. Remedies in these types of
cases can include:
 reading of a Notice of employee rights and cease and desist orders to
assembled groups of employees
 Access remedies.
“Where an employer unlawfully interferes with communications between
employees, or between employees and a union, the impact of that interference
requires a remedy that will ensure free and open communication. Allowing
union access to an employer’s bulletin board and providing the union with the
names and addresses of employees will restore employee/union
communication and assist the employees in hearing the union’s message
without fear of retaliation.” (GC 11-01, page 8)
NOTE: “Where an employer customarily uses electronic means to
communicate to employees, “regions should submit to the division of advice
on whether to seek a remedy including union access to those electronic means
of communication.” J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (2010)
GC 10-07 deals with Section 10 (j) injunctions and is designed to streamline that process
and avoid duplicative efforts.

GC Memorandum 11-06
Re Remedies for first contract disputes
General Counsel Solomon also gave regional offices more authority to seek
additional remedies in unfair labor practice cases involving first contract bargaining.
Remedies such as mandated bargaining schedules, extension of the certification year, and
reimbursement to unions of negotiating costs can now be ordered by the regions without
having to obtain advice from the Board’s Division of Advice. In addition, “noticereading” remedies can also be ordered by the regions without going through the Division
of Advice. Solomon said he was authorizing the regions to seek notice reading remedies
in first bargaining cases, depending on the facts, that might involve certain situations of
outright refusal to bargain; where an employer rejected all of the union’s proposed
bargaining dates; where an employer makes unilateral changes and refuses to provide
information to the union; where there was bad faith bargaining and discrimination against
union stewards, etc.
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GC Memorandum 11-07
Re Back Pay issues
In GC 11-07, Acting General Counsel urged reconsideration of two 2007 Board
decisions that require illegally discharged employees to start looking for a new job within
two weeks of being fired, and shifted the burden from the wrongdoer to the General
Counsel to prove that they have diligently pursued work throughout the backpay period.
Earnings from these other jobs are deducted from backpay awards. Earnings from these
other jobs are deducted from backpay awards. Mr. Solomon directed officials in the
agency’s 31 regional offices to identify cases in the field that could be used as vehicles to
ask the Board to reconsider the 2007 decisions. The first of those decisions was
Grosvenor Resort, 350 NLRB 1197 (2007), where the Board ruled that:
If a discriminatee began a reasonably diligent search anytime within [a two week]
period following discharge, then his or her backpay would run from the date of
the Respondent’s unlawful action. If, however, a discriminatee failed to
commence a search at some point within this two week period, then his or her
backpay would not begin to accrue until the discriminatee commenced a proper
job search.
In St. George’s Warehouse, 351 NLRB 961 (2007), the Board ruled with respect to back
pay issues:
We reaffirm that a respondent has the burden of persuasion as to the contention
that a discriminatee has failed to make a reasonable search for work. However, we
reach a different conclusion with respect to a part of the burden of going forward
with evidence. The contention that a discriminatee has failed to make a reasonable
search for work generally has two elements: (1) there were substantially
equivalent jobs within the relevant geographic area, and (2) the discriminatee
unreasonably failed to apply for these jobs. Current Board law places on the
respondent-employer the burden of production or going forward with evidence as
to both elements of the defense. As to the first element, we reaffirm that the
respondent-employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence.
However, as to the second element, the burden of going forward with the
evidence is properly on the discriminatee and the General Counsel who advocates
on his behalf to show that the discriminate took reasonable steps to seek those
jobs. They are in the best position to know of the discriminatee’s search or his
reasons for not searching. Thus, following the principle that the burden of going
forward should be placed on the party who is the more likely repository of the
evidence, we place this burden on the discriminatee and the General Counsel.
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GC Memorandum 11-08
In this memo the General Counsel outlined new methods for calculating backpay
hat includes daily compounded interest as recently ordered by the Board, and
compensates for such things as expenses to search for employment and tax penalties for
lump sum payments. This was designed to implement Jackson Hospital Corporation
d/b/a Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010), where the Board changed
its policy with regard to the assessment of interest on make whole orders. Under the new
policy, interest on make-whole awards is to be compounded on a daily basis, using the
established methods for computing backpay and for determining the applicable rate of
interest. This change was made in order to bring the National Labor Relations Board in
line with other comparable legal regimes (including the Internal Revenue Code) and to
better serve the remedial policies of the Act. In order to effectuate the change to daily
compound interest, it is necessary to make changes to the manner in which backpay and
other monetary awards are calculated.

General Counsel’s views regarding initiatives in Four States on guaranteeing the right
of employees within those states to a secret ballot election when deciding upon a union
Four states have enacted state constitutional amendments governing the method
by which employees would choose union representation. Such amendments would
require a secret ballot election in all cases, initiatives that were filed to head of the
enactment of the Employee Free Choice Act.
In January, the National Labor Relations Board advised the Attorneys General of
Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah that those recently-approved state
constitutional amendments governing the method by which employees choose union
representation conflict with federal labor law and therefore are preempted by the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The states were also advised that the Board has authorized the Acting General
Counsel to file lawsuits in federal court, if necessary, to enjoin them from enforcing the
laws. In letters to the attorney generals of each of those states, Acting General Counsel
Lafe Solomon indicated that the NLRA provides two paths to union recognitions: one
through the election process and the other through voluntary recognition of majority
status. The state amendments prohibit the second method and therefore interfere with the
exercise of a well-established federally-protected right. For that reason, they are
preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The amendments have
already taken effect in South Dakota and Utah, and are expected to become effective
soon in Arizona and South Carolina.
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All four attorney generals responded with a defense of their states’ constitutional
amendments, and the ball is now back in the General Counsel’s office to determine what
route he will take.
Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.) has introduced legislation (H.R. 1407) that would
protect such state initiatives for secret ballots in union representation elections. His bill,
the State Right to Vote Act, was introduced on March 11 and is now sitting in the House
Education and Workforce Committee.
The bill would amend the National Labor Relations Act by adding the following
language:
Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing or recognizing a labor
organization as the representative of employees unless the labor organization has
been selected by a majority of such employees in a secret ballot election
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board in any state or territory in
which such labor organization recognition is prohibited by state or territorial law
unless recognition is accomplished through a secret ballot election conducted by
the board.
In addition, it would provide:
No agency of the federal government may bring any challenge against a state
statute or constitutional provision which protects the right of employees to choose
labor organization representatives through secret ballot elections.

Rulemaking:
The third method by which the Obama Board will move in the direction of labor
will be through its power of rulemaking. The NLRB is authorized by statute to make
rules and regulations to enforce the Act, and although little used in the past, this Board
has already shown a propensity for using such powers. Chair Liebman has stated that
“Rule making is something that certainly academics have been talking about for some
time… I think it’s worth consideration.” Some examples of rule making activity thus far
include:
1. Required Posting of Rights under NLRA
The Board has proposed that all employers be required to post a notice informing
employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Public comment closed
on February 22, after thousands submitted their views pro and con. Opposition to the
proposed rule centered on the Board’s lack of statutory authority to require notice
postings by employers not specifically involved in NLRB proceedings. In addition, some
argue that the concept of a Board notice is an antiquated concept, not needed in this age
of Google and internet information. One lobbying group said that a quick Google search
of “forming a union” generated 17,000 hits – the first being an AFL-CIO posting on how
to form a union in the workplace.
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Those in favor argue that the rule requiring postings is within the Board’s
authority and will assist employees. The NLRA is unique among federal labor laws in
that it does not require such a posting within the statute itself, and union lobbying groups
contended employees remain unaware of their rights in many cases. Further, such a
posting of the law’s requirements would hardly be a serious burden for employers.
2. “Members Only” Bargaining
In August 2007, the United Steelworkers and six other unions filed a petition
asking the Board to engage in rulemaking to recognize members only bargaining. The
petition claims that nothing in the Act requires that a union representing employees must
have a majority status, and that the purposes of the Act can be served by allowing
employees to join together in labor organizations and be recognized by their employers,
even if they do not constitute a majority. In June 2010, forty six law professors sent a
letter to the NLRB urging them to use internal rule making to allow for members’ only
collective bargaining when a union does not have majority support.
The Board Division of Advice had expressed its view during the Bush Board
period that members only bargaining should not be required. In 2006, the NLRB’s
Division of Advice issued a memorandum in Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case No. 6-CA34821, in which the Board’s general counsel determined that a complaint should not be
issued on allegations that an employer unlawfully refused to bargain with an employee
council that representing a minority of the company’s employees.
Whether this issue will now be revisited by the Board through rulemaking is a
pending matter.

3. Possible shortening of time between petition and election?
In addition, recently appointed Board Member Mark Pearce gave a speech at
Suffolk University Law School in Boston in October 2010 during which he foreshadowed
some other potential changes through the NLRB’s rulemaking which could benefit
unions. One issue which Pearce discussed was the possible shortening of the time period
between the filing of an election petition and an election. While this change has not yet
been made, Pearce’s comments on it demonstrate that the Board is interested in making
changes to the legal landscape through its rulemaking process as well as its decisions.
Other issues that might be susceptible to rulemaking include the amount of
information that must be provided to an organizing union. For example, the Excelsior list
of names and addresses of unit employees prior to an election may be expanded to
include email addresses of unit employees.
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Employers should be alert to this shift by the NLRB towards a more pro-union
agenda. In particular, with the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”) seemingly
remaining stagnant in Congress, there may be cause for concern that the NLRB could
attempt to endorse significant portions of the EFCA through its rulemaking process
instead of through the legislature. To some degree, the more aggressive stance by the
General Counsel’s office on dealing with first contract violations and the suggestion that
rulemaking might solve the problem of undue delays between petition and election are
indicators that the Board may stretch as far as it can, within the bounds of statutory
restrictions, to provide some of the union wish list items that sat in the EFCA package.

Other Cases of Note from the Board
Research Foundation of SUNY, 355 NLRB No. 170 (2010)
In this case, a petitioning union sought to represent the post-doctoral associates at
the SUNY-Buffalo campus. The associates were technically employees of the Research
Foundation of SUNY, a private educational foundation that serves as a fiscal agent for
SUNY. In this regard, the Foundation administers the grant, hires the associates and sets
their pay and benefits within the parameters of the grant.
During the organizing campaign, a union organizer, Amy Melton, asked to visit
one of the associates in his office. Upon hearing about this planned meeting, the manager
of the Foundation checked with SUNY Human Resources to see whether he had to allow
the meeting to take place. He was told he did not. Consequently, the manager confronted
Ms. Melton in the office of the associate and told her that she had to leave since she was
on private property and if she did not, she would be arrested.
After the union lost the subsequent election (the tally was tied at 35-35), the union
filed objections. The Board majority of Chair Liebman and Member Pearce explained:
Objections 4 and 13 allege, collectively, that the Employer interfered with
employees’ protected activity by “threaten[ing] to have Union agents arrested in
or near the workplace, in such a manner as to interfere with employees’ rights to
organize and support the Union.” In support of these objections, the Petitioner’s
organizer testified that during her visit to the office of a unit employee to solicit
his support for the Union, an Employer official told her to leave the building or he
would call the police.
The Board began by citing the general rule under Lechmere decision is that
nonemployee organizers, like Melton, are not entitled to engage in Section 7 organizing
activity on the private property of others. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533
(1992). However, the Board quickly added:
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However, an employer has no right under Lechmere to exclude union
representatives engaged in Section 7 activity from areas in which it lacks
a property interest. Bristol Farms, 311 NLRB 437, 438 fn. 6 (1993) Therefore, as
the judge correctly noted in citing Indio Grocery Outlet,4 the threshold question
in cases such as this is whether the employer possessed a property interest
entitling it to exclude the union representative(s) from the area where the
proposed organizing activity was to occur.
On the factual question of property rights, the Board noted that the employer was on state
property, not property it owned. Second, there was no evidence of a lease between the
employer and the State of New York (though the administrative law judge had called the
employer a lessor). Further, the Board disagreed with the judge that the employer’s right
to take action derived from a state guideline prohibiting union organizing by outside
labor organizations on state property. While the State may have such a guideline to take
action, the employer is not the State and could not assert rights under that guideline.
Next, while the employer said he had been delegated the right to expel the union
organizer on behalf of the state since he contacted SUNY’s Human Resources Director.
The Board noted that, while there was discussion about whether the manager had to let
Ms. Melton stay, there was no direct delegation by the Human Resources Director to the
manager to enforce the state’s guidelines.
Given the fact that no property rights could be established, there was no basis for
the manager to throw Ms. Melton out of the building. Once this was established, the
Board had little difficulty in finding the conduct of the manager in throwing out the
organizing and threatening arrest to be objectionable conduct. The Board overturned the
decision of the ALJ, who had found no objectionable conduct, and ordered a new
election.
Member Schaumber disagreed with the majority. He began by writing:
I agree with the judge that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Employer
engaged in objectionable conduct when one of its officials informed a trespassing
union organizer, who was on the premises in violation of state regulations, that
the organizer could not meet with an employee on the property during work
hours. It simply cannot be said that this isolated directive had such a tendency to
interfere with employee free choice that it could have affected the election results.
Rather, as the judge found, both the employee and organizer had ample alternative
opportunities to discuss the pros and cons of unionization prior to the election,
and the incident was disseminated to no other employee. Contrary to my
colleagues, therefore, I would adopt the judge’s overruling of the Union’s
Objections 4 and 13, and certify the results of the election.
Member Schaumber notes that the majority was so entranced by whether or not the
employer had a property interest in the building (he felt that they did anyway) that it
avoided confronting the real question, namely,
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…whether the alleged objectionable conduct, taken as a whole, warrants a new
election because it has “the tendency to interfere with the employees’ freedom of
choice” and “could well have affected the outcome of the election.” Metaldyne
Corp., 339 NLRB 352 (2003). My colleagues, focused as they are on property
interests not at issue, fail to explain how the directive to Melton to leave Sherman
Hall could possibly have affected the election outcome.
He noted that the employee involved and Melton did not even know each other, that the
two could have met off site and that the Foundation manager did not tell the employee he
could not engage in protected activity, but rather simply told an intruder to leave the
building.

Manhattan College, Case No. 2-RC-23543 (Region 2 decision involving adjuncts and
religious institutions)
On January 10, 2011, the Regional Director for Region 2 issued a Decision and
Direction of Election at Manhattan College in New York for a unit of “all individuals
employed at part-time faculty with an adjunct academic rank who teach a minimum of a
three (3) credit college degree level course for a full semester (or the equivalent hours of
a semester length courses).”
This decision followed a complex hearing on the question of whether the NLRB
should exercise jurisdiction over the Catholic college or whether Manhattan is a “churchoperated institution whose faculty are exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction under the
Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) Catholic
Bishop held that the Board could not assert jurisdiction over lay teachers in a churchoperated school because to do so would create a “significant risk” that First Amendment
rights would be infringed. Two ways in which that could happen under Catholic Bishop
were (1) the Board might infringe on religious freedom by inquiring into the good faith of
assertions by clergy-administrators that action alleged to be unfair labor practices were
mandated by the school’s religious creed; (2) the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction might
require the Board to determine the terms and conditions of employment in order to define
the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining for church-operated schools.
While Catholic Bishop centers on parochial schools, the Board has applied the
case to educational institutions at all levels on a case by case basis. St. Joseph’s College,
282 NLRB 65 (1986). Since then, the Board has declined jurisdiction over a school
“whose purpose and function in substantial part are to propagate a religious faith.” Jewish
Day School, 283 NLRB757 (1987); Nazareth Regional High School, 282 NLRB 763
(1987)(school’s mission was “to transmit the teachings of Jesus Christ and His Church”).
The Board has asserted jurisdiction where the church involvement with the
college not to a level where it “creates a significant risk of constitutional infringement.”
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Livingstone College, 286 NLRB1308, 1309 (1987); University of Great Falls, 331 NLRB
1663.
Applying these standards to Manhattan, the Regional Director found that the
primary purpose of Manhattan is secular and not the propagation of a religious faith. The
RD indicated that the College had asserted that it had no intention of imposing “Church
affiliation and religious observance as a condition for hiring or admission, to set quotas
based on religious affiliations, to require loyalty oaths, attendance at religious services, or
courses in Catholic theology.” There was a commitment to a continued relationship with
the Christian Brothers but the College also affirmed its commitment to academic freedom
and to institutional autonomy.
The role of adjunct faculty does not involve propagating religious faith in any
way, and the RD stated that “[b]ecause adjunct faculty are not required to advance a
religious mission in any way, exercising jurisdiction over the College will not have any
‘potential effects’ leading to unconstitutional entanglement.
The Regional Director disagreed with the College’s argument that concluding that
the college is not a church operated school within the meaning of Catholic Bishop based
on factors that its religious activities are not compulsory and its educational activities do
not include indoctrination is “a view of religious that the Board cannot endorse without
imposing its own definition of approved faith in clear violation of the First Amendment.”
The Regional Director said that such inquiries were part and parcel of examining the case
in light of Catholic Bishop.
The purpose of considering whether indoctrination, proselytizing or in the
Supreme Court’s terminology, “propagation of a religious faith,” is part of a
school’s purpose is because rules requiring faculty to propagate faith would
require bargaining over such rules and their disciplinary consequences and,
further, would require the Board to scrutinize an employer’s defense to unfair
labor practice charges based on asserted enforcement of faith-based rules.
The Regional Director noted that the D.C. Circuit has refused to endorse the
Board cases asserting jurisdiction based on the Board’s test, and instead has ruled that an
organization is exempted if it:
1. Holds itself out to students, faculty, and community as providing a religious
educational environment
2. is organized as a non-profit; and
3. is affiliated with, owned by, operated, controlled directly or indirectly by a
recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is
determined, at least in part, with reference to religion. University of Great Falls v.
NLRB, 278 F. 3d 1335, 1343 (2002)
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The Board has not adopted the D.C. Circuit test but the Regional Director indicated that,
even if it did apply those tests, Manhattan would not be exempt. While conceding points
two and three, the RD said that the College does not hold itself out as providing a
religious educational environment.
While a recent Trustee Report, the Sponsorship Covenant and the new Catholic
Studies academic requirement would seem to point in the direction of exemption, the RD
explained that the Trustees Report actually tries to disengage the educational scholarship
work of the founder of the Order, De La Salle, from its roots in Catholic France of the
17th century. Admissions brochures make reference to De La Salle “but not to the
Church, religion or Catholicism,” and the De La Salle references are secular in nature.
Further, the College’s own Trustee Report indicates that forty years earlier, the
College’s elimination of church control, adjustments to compulsory religious activities
and lack of religious test for employment or admission made the College eligible for aid
from New York State under the Bundy Law. Similarly, the Introduction Booklet given to
all potential hires states that the College “is neither controlled by the state of the Church
and is, as such, an accredited institution of higher learning in New York State. The RD
concluded:
While the College may well be affiliated with the Church and take pride in its
historical relationship with the Church, the College’s public representations
clearly demonstrate that it is not providing “a religious educational environment”
and therefore even under the D.C. Circuit test, the Board should exercise
jurisdiction over the College.

El Paso Electric Co., 355 NLRB No. 95 (2010) (Alleged direct dealing)
In this case, involving allegations of direct dealing with employees but the CEO
of a company during contract negotiations, the facts were that negotiations were taking
place in a particular office building downtown. There was a group of employee
demonstrators outside the building in support of their union. The CEO Gary Hedrick
happened to be arriving at a restaurant across the street from the demonstration with his
wife and heard his name called. He stopped by the demonstration, quieted the crowd and
told them he stopped to hear what their concerns were. One employee told him they were
concerned about the company’s driver policy and that it was too ambiguous. Hedrick said
he would check into it. The employee said if he could change the policy, he’d get a
contract. During this confrontation, one of the union negotiators showed up and talked a
bit with Hedrick.
Later the same employee who talked to Hedrick called him at his office and asked
if he had looked into the policy. Hedrick said he had, and he agreed it was ambiguous. He
told the employee that he had instructed his negotiators to tighten up the language.
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The Board majority of Liebman and Pearce found this to be direct dealing and
undercutting the union.
The established criteria for finding that an employer has engaged in unlawful
direct dealing are “(1) that the [employer] was communicating directly with
union-represented employees; (2) the discussion was for the purpose of
establishing or changing wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment
or undercutting the Union’s role in bargaining; and (3) such communication was
made to the exclusion of the Union.” Permanente Medical Group, 332 NLRB
1143, 1144 (2000), citing Southern California Gas Co., 316 NLRB 979 (1995).
The Board found that, based on the cited facts, these three criteria were met. In contrast,
Member Schaumber found insufficient evidence of an 8(a)(5) violation.
The conduct at issue here falls far short of “[G]oing behind the back of the
exclusive bargaining representative to seek the input of employees on a proposed
change in working conditions.” Allied-Signal, Inc., 307 NLRB 752, 753 (1992).
In Allied-Signal, for example, without even notifying the union, the employer
formed an employee task force to discuss the limits on management’s proposed
smoking ban and any penalties that might be imposed for violating it. And in
General Electric Co., 150 NLRB 192, 195 (1964), cited by the majority, the
employer used a broad-based direct marketing campaign to employees away from
the bargaining table to promote support for its bargaining proposals and to
disparage any conflicting proposals by their union bargaining representative.
Nothing like that happened here. Instead, as would any good employer interested
in the concerns of his employees, Hedrick took the time to listen to Enriquez’
inquiries and to respond to them. Since the inquiries concerned a subject of
bargaining, Hedrick’s responses were brief and vague. In sum, Hedrick showed
concern for an employee, not the subject of bargaining about which she inquired,
which at all times remained exclusively within the province of the Union’s
representatives to negotiate with the Respondent. Under these circumstances,
Hedrick’s conduct surely did not undercut the Union’s role in bargaining. I would
therefore dismiss the allegation that the Respondent engaged.

American Med. Response of Conn., NLRB Reg. 34, No. 34-CA-12576, complaint
issued 10/27/10) (Section 7 rights in the context of social media)
Seizing on an issue that could affect nearly any employer with a blogging or
social media policy, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”), through one of its Regional Directors, recently issued a Complaint against an
employer who terminated an employee, at least in part, for having posted on Facebook
negative comments about her supervisor.
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The case was scheduled to go to trial in January 2011, but AMR agreed to change
the overly broad rules on employee communication under a settlement agreement
approved by the Board. Under the settlement, the company agreed to revise its rules to
ensure that they do not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours
and working conditions with co-workers and others while not at work.
The facts of the case were as follows:
The employer had received a customer complaint regarding the employee’s work.
The employee was allegedly called in by her supervisor to answer questions regarding the
matter. The NLRB Complaint states that when the employee requested union
representation at the interview the employer refused, and threatened her with discipline
for making the request.
After returning home from work, the employee posted a negative comment
regarding her supervisor on Facebook. She allegedly then received supportive comments
from some of her co-workers, and went on to post additional negative comments about
her supervisor.
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from discharging,
disciplining, or otherwise discriminating against, an employee who engages in “protected
concerted activity.” Such activity generally includes discussions with co-workers as to
wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. The NLRB alleges that
the employer fired the employee for posting the negative comments about the supervisor
on Facebook, and that this is unlawful interference with protected, concerted employee
activity. The employer denied this, stating that the employee was discharged for multiple
serious issues, not simply the negative posting.
Of particular interest is the fact that the employer has a handbook containing
policies that prohibit employees from certain kinds of blogging or internet postings.
Among other things, the handbook bars employees from making “disparaging,
discriminatory or defamatory comments when discussing the company or the employee's
superiors, co-workers and/or competitors.” The NLRB Complaint alleges that such a rule
is unlawful on its face.
This issue has unusually broad ramifications about employee use of internet social
media and employer attempts to restrict that activity. The NLRB is typically considered a
watchdog over union-management relations, but the National Labor Relations Act
actually protects the right of all employees – union and non-union – to engage in
“protected, concerted activity.” The concept of protected, concerted activity includes
employees simply discussing work-related issues, concerns or complaints, even in a
completely non-union setting. “Water cooler” chit-chat has become internet social media
chit-chat. If the NLRB rules that employees’ disgruntled discussions about supervisors
via Facebook are under the umbrella of protected, concerted activity, then all employers,
whether or not their employees are represented by a union, have to be concerned about
how they react to and attempt to regulate employee activity on the internet. This will
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have implications for the specific contents of employee handbooks and policies already in
place. Until the case is decided, employers should be careful in drafting, promulgating
and enforcing policies as to blogging, postings on social media sites, etc.

Bannering
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 355 NLRB No. 159 (2010), a 3-2 Board
majority held that a union’s stationary “bannering” – as opposed to picketing – of a
neutral employer was not unlawful secondary activity. The case involved a primary
dispute between a non-union employer and a union that wanted to represent its
employees. The union displayed a large stationary banner on a public sidewalk near the
entrance of a third party employer that said: “Shame [followed by the name of the neutral
employer],” followed by the phrase “labor dispute.”
General Counsel for the Board had argued that the posting individuals at or near
the entrance of the secondary employer’s facilities to hold banners declaring that a labor
dispute existed constituted picketing and was coercive. Secondly, the banners were
coercive because they contained fraudulent wording that would lead one to believe the
dispute was with the neutral employer.
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization:
(ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce where an object thereof is –
(B) forcing or requiring any person to .. cease doing business with any other
person.”

The Board ruled otherwise. The Board noted first that Congress adopted this
provision with the objective of shielding unoffending employers from improper pressure
intended to induce them to stop doing business with another employer with whom the
union has a dispute. But according to the majority, the focus of Congress was on
picketing as a pressure tactic by unions.
The Board then explained that the Act does not define “picketing.” The Board
stated that, through case law, picketing has usually involved “persons carrying picket
signs and patrolling back and forth before an entrance to a business or worksite.”
Bannering does not meet that definition.
The banner displays here did not constitute such proscribed picketing because
they did not create confrontation. Banners are not picket signs. Furthermore, the
union representatives held the banners stationary, without any form of patrolling.
Nor did the union representatives hold the banner in front of any entrance to a
secondary site in a manner such that anyone entering the site had to pass between
the union representatives. The banners were located at a sufficient distance from
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the entrances so that anyone wishing to enter or exit the site could do so without
confronting the banner holders in any way.

In short, the Board found that the display of a stationary banner, like handbilling,
is noncoercive conduct falling outside of the Act’s prohibitions. The bannering lacked the
confrontational aspect that is involved in picketing.
The dissent noted that the majority had taken a narrow view of picketing based on
sketchy legislative history, and that the bannering in this case clearly was proscribed.
This decision was followed up by Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters
(New Star General Contractors), 356 NLRB No. 88 (February 4, 2011) where the Board,
citing its earlier ruling, decided that similar large banners used to “shame” neutral
employers into stop doing business with an employer with whom the union had a primary
dispute was not violative of the Act. The General Counsel claimed that the bannering was
a signal to the employees of the neutral employer to stop work. But the Board said that
without further evidence that the banners were intended by the union to be a “signal” to
stop work, the Board could not find a violation.
Member Hayes dissented saying that the bannering was “the confrontational
equivalent of picketing.”
___________________________________________________

Parexcel International, 356 NLRB No. 82 (2011) (Preemptive Discharge Violates Act)
In Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82 (January 28, 2011), the Board held
that an employer violated the Act by terminating an employee in order to prevent that
employee from engaging in protected activity.
In this case, a registered nurse spoke with a recently rehired employee from South
Africa about whether he and his wife had received inducements to return to work. The
employee, falsely, said yes, he had received a raise to come back. The nurse then went to
her supervisor and claimed that entire unit should quit and then come back with a raise.
The nurse also stated that the manager whom she believed approved the raise and who
was also South African, looked after employees from that country.
When questioned by management, the nurse admitted she has raised these points
to her immediate supervisor but noted she has not talked to any other employees about it.
About a week later the nurse was terminated. She filed charges claiming she was
terminated for engaging in protected activity. At the hearing, the ALJ found that she had
not engaged in protected activity, and the Board agreed. However, even though the
employee had not engaged in such activity, the Board majority found that the employee
was terminated because of the employer’s concern that she might in the future discuss
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favoritism with regard to wages and preferential treatment for South Africans. The
employer, the Board majority of Liebman and Becker said, was trying to “nip in the bud”
future concerted activity. This was a violation of the Act.
If an employer acts to prevent concerted protected activity – to nip in the bud—
that action interferes with and restrains the exercise of Section 7 rights and is
unlawful without more

While the Board majority could cite no cases in support, it did opine that other cases have
found employer’s guilty of violating the Act when the employer believed an employee
was engaged in protected activity even though he was not. See for example Metropolitan
Orthopedic Assn., 237 NLRB 427 (1978).
What is critical in these cases is not what the employee did but rather the
employer’s intent to suppress protected concerted activity

Court Decisions
Pye v. The Longy School of Music (Injunctive Relief for Failure to Bargain Under
NLRA)
In Pye v. The Longy School of Music, -- F. Supp. --, 2011 WL 18872 (D.Mass.,
2011), the federal district court ruled that the Longy School of Music did not owe a duty
to bargain over the restructuring of its faculty in furtherance of its plan to cancel its
undergraduate program and merge with another institution. However, the school was
required to bargain over how it would decide to layoff or reassign faculty, whom it would
decide to layoff or reassign, whether those faculty would be given a second chance to
adjust to the new model, and what would happen with the employees who were to be laid
off and reassigned.
The court ruled that the balance of hardships caused by the private school’s
unilateral terminations and reassignments of faculty tipped in favor of a preliminary
injunction compelling the school to reinstate terminated faculty with pay.
In this case, the regional director moved for preliminary injunctive relief under
section 10 (j) of the National Labor Relations Act and such relief was granted.
The school had been explored its long term future when in early 2010, its faculty
unionized. The union was certified on February 1, 2010. On March 5, the President met
with faculty as a whole to layout a strategic plan that included a merger with Bard
College, a reorganization of the Conservatory and CP divisions of the school and the
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phasing out of the undergraduate program among other items. When asked why the union
was not involved in the strategic planning, the President said that “this is not business as
usual, we still have management rights. This is outside the normal course of business. We
are in a recession and that’s why I am making the decisions.”
On March 8, the union requested bargaining on the impact of the changes
announced. The administration and union did meet and Longy told the union that the
changed affected “big picture management issues” that affected non-union employees as
well, and therefore a meeting with a subsection of faculty before the March 5 meeting
would have been inappropriate. It also indicated, however, that the changes were not to
be made until the end of the year and that Longy still had a duty to bargain over their
effects.
On March 11, Longy sent notices to all faculty about their status. Eight unit
members were told their contracts would not be renewed. Thirty three others were
divisionally reassigned. Five chairs were relieved of their duties. Each letter invited the
faculty member to contact the administration if they had questions.
In addition, Longy made changes to health insurance benefits. Coverage was
switched from Harvard Pilgrim to Blue Cross, with slightly less generous benefits (some
co-pays were increased) but there was also a reduction in premiums.
In the months that followed, collective bargaining did occur but without much
progress. The union claimed that the school was not bargaining in good faith; the school
claimed the union failed to submit a complete proposal and wanted to bargain over nonmandatory subjects. Charges were eventually filed and on October 13, 2010, the Region
issued a Complaint, asserting violations of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) by terminating
employees; changing job assignments; changing health insurance carriers and benefits;
and other related changes, as well as allegedly threatening faculty with termination if they
were not loyal to the school.
The Region moved for injunctive relief to reinstate the eight unit members and
other relief.
In analyzing this case, the Court reviewed the injunction standard of “likelihood
of success on the merits.”
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address Longy’s assertion that faculty
restructuring occurred before the Union was certified and thus before Longy was
required to bargain. This would be a much closer case if Longy had already made
specific plans to change employment policies but had yet to formally announce
them before the union election. By the time the Union was on the scene, the
school had certainly begun to consider faculty restructuring but it has yet to settle
on the number of faculty it hoped to terminate or reassign or the specific criteria it
would use in deciding which faculty to terminate.
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But the Court went on to say:
But this does not mean the Longy necessarily had a duty to bargain over all of its
decisions. Specifically, even if the NLRB could establish that the concrete
decision to move towards a core faculty modeled post-dated the Union’s election,
Longy would not owe a duty to bargain over this broad, structural change. In First
National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court….
described a trio of categories of management decisions that might affect the terms
and conditions of employment. First are those decisions like “advertising and
promotion, product type and design, and financing arrangements which have only
an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship.” Management
within its entrepreneurial discretion had the authority to make these changes
without first bargaining with a union. Second, are those those decisions “such as
the order of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules
which are almost exclusively an aspect of the relationship between employer and
employee. These kinds of decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining as long
as the “benefit of labor management relations and the collective bargaining
process does not outweigh the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
These decisions involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise are
akin to the decision as to whether to be in business at all not itself primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to
terminate employment.
The Court went on to say that Longy’s decision to move to a core faculty model
falls within that third category. It was a fundamental shift in the way the school did
business. The decisions to restructure its faculty and take other structural steps were
‘harmonized with its plans to cancel its undergraduate program and merge with another
institution. They were more analogous to a plant manager’s decision to begin
manufacturing a different product than a decision to subcontract work to a new set of
employees in order to reduce labor costs.
Additionally, the court said, “the burdens of bargaining over the decision to move
to a core faculty would outweigh any marginal benefit for employees and the Union.”
This decision was not about labor costs; it was as key component in a long term vision
for changing the institution.” Further, forcing Longy to bargain over its decision would
significantly abridge its freedom to manage the academic business of the school.
But despite Longy’s prerogative to pursue faculty restructuring, it did have a duty
to bargain over the effects of this decision, and the effects of the decision to restructure
may have included specific changes to the employment contracts of Longy’s employees.
The question of whether the school had to terminate a certain number of faculty could
certainly have been amenable to collective bargaining.
Here, while Longy said it was bargaining over effects, it never made a serious
proposal affecting those faculty who had been terminated or reassigned and it presented
decisions about individual employees as non-negotiable.
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Longy was entitled to develop a plan to restructure its faculty without consulting
the union. But it was required to place a number of other issues on the bargaining
table. These included how it would decide to layoff or reassign faculty; whom it
would decide to layoff or reassign; whether these faculty would be given a second
chance to adjust to the new model; and what would happen with the employees
that would be laid off and reassigned.
Having found a likelihood of success on these issues, the Court turned to the matter of
irreparable harm for purposes of deciding the injunction issue. While noting that the
Court did not believe it was in “any better position to repair the harm caused by Longy’s
alleged unilateral changes to employee health benefits than an ALJ will be a few months
from now,” it noted that the changes announced in March 2010 have had a much more
substantial impact on collective bargaining and how employees perceive the union.
The issue here is not just the harm to individual employees but the way that
Longy’s changes impacted collective bargaining, an especially important
consideration because the union and Longy had yet to negotiate a first collective
bargaining agreement…. While the union represents the interests of the faculty
during this tumultuous period, it should have all the advantages it is owed under
the law, including the employment of terminated faculty who will be impacted by
Longy’s plans.
Independent of the harm to the bargaining process, Longy’s actions have
potentially impacted the union’s standing among Longy’s faculty. The Board cites
a number of examples to argue that Longy’s unilateral changes likely
compromised the union’s “prestige and legitimacy” among Longy’s employees.
[cites omitted]. This concern is heightened in this case because of the union’s
recent election. National labor policy recognizes the precariousness of union
support during the first year after its certification. [cites omitted] Some form of
preliminary relief is warranted in order to stave off further erosion of union
support.
The Court ordered Longy to reinstated terminated faculty until Longy and the union
bargain to an impasse over the effects of the decision to restructure the faculty. The
school was not required to give them any specific assignments or recreate chair positions.
But it was required to pay terminated faculty the salary they would have been receiving. .
Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, (Applying Supreme Court’s decision in 14
Penn Plaza)
In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency,(10th Cir. Ct Appeals, No. 09-1233
(March 16, 2011), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employee who
arbitrated and lost his arbitration case claiming national origin discrimination may still
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bring his case to court, despite the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in 14 Penn Plaza v.
Pyett, 129 S.Ct.1456 (2009).
The plaintiff, John Mathews, was represented by a union. He was demoted from
his role as supervisor after allegations that he had made inappropriate remarks to a female
co-worker. He claimed he himself was discriminated against because of his national
origin (Indian) and that he was retaliated for filing prior complaints over discrimination.
The relevant portion of the collective bargaining agreement governing his grievance read:
The Employer and the Union acknowledge continuation of their policies of no
discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of age, sex, race,
religious beliefs, color, national origin or disability in accordance with and as
required by applicable state and federal laws.
After a multi-day arbitration, an arbitrator denied his grievance. The arbitrator
explicitly reviewed the discrimination claim and ruled that although he had made out a
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas standards, he had failed to
show that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for demotion were
pretextual.
Mathews brought suit under Title VII. At the district court level, the court said
that because the union contract had an anti-discrimination clause that covered his
statutory claims, then his submission to arbitration effectively waived his right to sue in
court.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S.36
(1974), the Court held that simply because he lost his contract discrimination claim in
contract arbitration does not mean he cannot pursue the statutory claim of discrimination
in court. In its ruling, the court distinguished 14 Penn Plaza from Gardner Denver and
the facts of this case.
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court explained [in 14 Penn Plaza], denied
preclusive effect to a prior arbitral decision “because the collective bargaining
agreement did not cover statutory claims.” Id at 1467. It therefore followed that
the Gardner-Denver arbitrator could not decide questions of “statutory rights”
regardless of whether the plaintiff’s “contractual rights” [were] similar to,
duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII.” Id. This jurisprudence
remained sound, but does not “control the outcome where… the collective
bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and
contractual discrimination claims.” Id. At 1469 (emphasis added). Because the
collective bargaining agreement in 14 Penn Plaza did expressly cover statutory
claims, Gardner-Denver had no bearing and the terms of the arbitration agreement
controlled.
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Here, however, the anti-discrimination clause did not explicitly embrace statutory claims
to a degree sufficient to provide preclusive effect.
Although the parties acknowledged that violations of statutory law would also
constitute violations of the contract, this does not mean that the CBA covered
statutory claims or that the parties believed it to do so. Indeed, the district court’s
conclusion ignored the “distinctly separate nature” of contractual and statutory
rights, which is “not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the
same factual occurrence.” Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 50. This reasoning does
not change even though the contours of the CBA’s anti-discrimination protections
were defined by reference to federal law. Rather, unionized employees of the
Agency subjected to discriminatory treatment hold two similar claims, one based
in statute and one based in contract. The operative question remains whether the
CBA’s arbitration provisions are broad enough to encompass Mathew’s statutory
claims, such that his submission to arbitration operated as a waiver of forum or
election of remedy.
Applying Supreme Court precedent to the facts of Mathews’s case, it is evident
that no waiver of judicial forum has occurred…. Because the arbitration
agreement empowered the arbitrator to resolve only the dispute submitted, and
because the dispute submitted made no mention of statutory claims, the arbitral
decision could in no way determine the question of Mathews’ statutory rights.
Appropriately, the Agency’s representative at arbitration agreed that the issue
before the arbitrator was whether “the company discriminated against Mr.
Mathews in violation of Section 11, Article II of the contract, and the arbitral
decision phrased the question decided strictly in terms of Mathews’ contractual
rights under the CBA: “Did the Grievant’s demotion violate the contractual
provisions prohibiting discrimination?”

Some other state level cases of interest
Portland State University Chapter of AAUP v. Portland State University, 240 Ore.
App. 108, Ore. App. LEXIS 1657 (December 29, 2010). Detailed case involving
application of Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza v Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009). In this case, the grievance procedure failed to incorporate the statutory law, as
required by the Supreme Court’s decision in order for the arbitration clause to preclude
the individual from agency or court filing.
__________________________________________________ .
In re Rosenberg, 2010 WL 3259740 (Vt., 2010), a unionized adjunct professor
claimed the Vermont State Colleges discriminated against her because of her protected
activity when it failed to assign her courses for a given semester. In addition, the union
alleged that the collective bargaining agreement was not followed in making such
assignments.
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The Vermont Supreme Court, affirming a Vermont Labor Relations Board
finding, stated that the grievant and union failed to demonstrate that her protected activity
of filing grievances was a motivating factor in the failure to assign her courses under the
collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that an employer’s knowledge of an
employee’s protected activity is not enough to infer discriminatory motive for purposes
of a retaliation claim. There must be clear nexus between the activity and the adverse
action, and this is the employee’s burden.
Despite the fact that the nonassignment of courses occurred after grievant filed
several grievances, she produced no evidence from which the labor board or this
Court could infer discriminatory motive.
Further, despite the union’s claim that the contract required strict adherence to
seniority when assigning adjuncts to introductory courses, the Court noted that the union
contract provided no such rule. The contract stated that seniority shall govern
assignments only when all other factors, including relative qualifications, were equal. All
course assignments were subject to this standard. Any claim of oral understandings to the
contrary that were allegedly made during bargaining were irrelevant in light of the clear
contract language.. The collective bargaining agreement was unambiguous as to the right
of the College to consider relative qualifications and not just seniority in assigning all
courses to adjunct faculty. Thus, any assignment issue must be analyzed under such
language. The College’s judgment to assign other adjuncts to courses instead of the
grievant, despite her seniority, was reasonable under such contract standards.
______________________________________
In Mitchell v. University Medical Center, (W.D. Ky, No. 3:07-cv-00414, August
9, 2010), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky ruled that a nurse
who talked about her Christian faith with fellow employees and described her
calculations regarding the date for the end of the world cannot proceed with a Title VII
claim of religious discrimination.
In this case, the employee, Claudette Mitchell, worked as an operating room nurse
at the Medical Center at the University of Louisville. She claimed that she read a certain
passage in the Bible and that when she did, she knew that God had told her to read other
passages in order to calculate certain future events. In doing so, she said that it became
clear to her that the date of December 21, 2033 would either mark the appearance of the
Antichrist, or the end of the world. She became to share this information with her fellow
employees, some of whom told her to stop because she was scaring them. Employees
complained to her supervisor, telling her that Ms. Mitchell was plotting the end of the
world; that they were uncomfortable with her discussions. Others were simply concerned
about her well-being. Eventually, her supervisor told Mitchell not to discuss religion at
work and told her that if it continued, she would be subject to discipline.
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Mitchell said she would resign. She said she was being singled out because other
employees discuss their religion at work. She did in fact leave, despite efforts by the
hospital to have her stay if she would temper her remarks. She later filed charges
claiming discrimination.
While recognizing that an employer has a duty to accommodate someone’s deeply
held religious beliefs, the Court noted that her religious accommodation claim had to fail
her because the hospital could not reasonably accommodate her conflict without undue
business hardship. Her conversations with employees were offensive and troubling to
them and any accommodation of her behavior necessarily would infringe on the rights of
other workers. Further, there was no real harassment of her because of her religion since
all that occurred was a directive from her supervisor to stop talking about religion. No
one degraded her or insulted her because of her religion.

_____________________________
In Maine Community College System and Maine State Employees Association,
SEIU Local 1989, (Case no. 10-UDA-01, 2010), the Maine Labor Relations Board ruled
that a proposed bargaining unit of “all adjunct faculty members employed by the Maine
Community College System who teach credit courses” was appropriate for bargaining.
The Board rejected the employer position that such adjunct faculty were not “regular
employees” under the Act because they did not occupy a “position” or discretely
identifiable slot to be funded, budgeted or tracked.” The Board said:
Whether a particular adjunct faculty is employed semester by semester or whether
a particular course is offered from semester to semester has nothing to do with
whether the position of “adjunct faculty member” exists on a continual basis – it
merely reflects the needs of the college and the number of individuals who are
employed and in the bargaining unit during any given semester.

35
Published by The Keep, 2011

35

